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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) , stating that the Court 
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the 
District Court involving domestic relations cases, including 
but not limited to divorce and property division. Rule 3 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also indicates a 
procedure for taking appeals from judgments and orders of 
trial courts. This brief follows the structural 
requirements outlined in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Proceduree This is an appeal by Odell M. Smith, 
Jr., Defendant, from a judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
making the award of alimony that it did. 
2. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are insufficient to support the award of alimony. 
3. Whether the Court properly entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law where Defendant's attorney 
objected to certain findings but withdrew as counsel. 
4. Whether the Court erred in obligating Defendant to 
pay an income tax liability. 
5. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are insufficient to support the award of attorney's fees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellate 
Court must reverse if there is a misapplication or 
misunderstanding of the law, if the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings or conclusions or if 
there is a serious inequity that must be rectified as set 
forth in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Honorable Clint S. Judkins sitting as a 
District Court Judge on or about October 14, 1992. R. 
68-78 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
At trial, Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as 
"Kaylene") appeared and was represented by Attorney Jeff R. 
Thome. Defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Odell") , 
appeared and was represented by Attorney Brent E. Johns. A 
trial was held on the matter in which the only witnesses 
were Kaylene, Odell and Kaylene's daughter. Judge Judkins 
entered his decision on the day of trial and Plaintiff's 
attorney prepared a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce. (T. 173-178). 
Kaylene's attorney prepared a Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and forwarded same 
to Odell's attorney on or about September 24, 1992. R. 66. 
(Letter to Brent Johns dated September 24, 1992.) Odell's 
attorney objected to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 17 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce as set forth in his letter to Kaylene's attorney 
dated October 1, 1992. R. 67 (Letter to Jeff Thorne dated 
October 1, 1992.) Odell's attorney withdrew as counsel on 
October 14, 1992. R. 84 (Withdrawal of Counsel.) Kaylene's 
attorney forwarded, together with a letter to the Court the 
Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as well as Brent Johns letter of October 1, 1992. R. 65 
(Letter to Judge Judkins dated October 5, 1992.) Kaylene's 
attorney then submitted the Decree and Findings without 
making any of the changes suggested by Brent Johns, Odell's 
attorney. The Decree and Findings were submitted to Court 
together with a letter which indicated in part that it was 
being submitted for "either signing or modification as you 
see fit". R. 65 (Letter to Judge Judkins dated October -5, 
1992.) Judge Judkins made one change at paragraph 16 of the 
Findings of Fact, signed the Decree of Divorce which was 
entered on October 14, 1992. R. 68 - 83 (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Decree of Divorce.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kaylene and Odell met in the summer of 1980 when 
Kaylene gained employment as a secretary at Odell*s Grain 
Elevator operation. Both parties were married to other 
people at the time. (T. 11 and 12) Some time later, the 
relationship developed into a romantic relationship. (T. 12) 
Kaylene obtained a divorce from her husband in 1983. The 
relationship continued on an irregular basis until Odell was 
divorced. Odell obtained a divorce from his wife in 1986. 
(T. 13 and 69) At that time, Odell assisted Kaylene in 
moving to Brigham City, Utah in January of 1986. (T. 70) 
Odell also moved into a separate residence in Brigham City, 
Utah in June of 1986. (T. 70 and 71) The parties maintained 
separate residences but continued their relationship until 
they were married on August 14, 1989. (T. 17 and 73 - 74) 
The parties did not live together under one roof or hold 
themselves out to me married until the time they were 
married in 1989. (T. p. 175) 
Pursuant to his divorce from his former wife, Odell 
received a settlement to compensate him for his interest in 
the family farm operation which settlement, actually 
received by Odell, was $249,000.00. It is disputed as to 
both the amount of settlement and as to how the amounts were 
arrived at. Odell did not work during the time of the 
marriage, as a result of a head injury. (T. p. 116) 
Kaylene worked for Brigham Realty, Richard's Manufacturing 
Jewelers and Weinstocks while the parties resided in Brigham 
Citv. (T. p. 51 - 53). 
Kaylene filed a Verified Complaint, Order to Show Cause 
and Temporary Restraining Order on September 13, 1991 (R. 1 
- 11). A trial was held on August 28, 1992, and the divorce 
entered October 14, 1992. T. 68 - 78 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law) Odell filed a timely appeal from this 
decision on November 12, 1992. R. 85 and 86. (Notice of 
Appeal) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Odell1s Appeal is primarily centered around three (3) 
issues, those being alimony, division of an income tax 
liability and attorney fees. The Court abused its 
discretion in these areas or entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which were not adequately supported by 
the evidence or which were insufficient altogether. 
It is also an issue as to whether the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were appropriately entered, given the 
Withdrawal of Odell1s attorney simultaneous to entry of 
those Findings and Conclusions. 
With regard to alimony, the Court erred in at least 
three (3) aspects. First, the findings are inadequate and 
are not based upon the evidence at trial. The Findings 
specifically note that the parties did not, prior to 
marriage, represent themselves to be husband and wife. In 
fact, this finding was a specific ruling wherein the Court 
held that even though there was a long term relationship 
there was no marriage relationship that existed prior to the 
formal marriage of the parties. T. 175. Not withstanding 
this fact, the findings contained certain items which were 
contested at trial and objected to by Odell1s attorney. 
Those being the statement that it was commonly recognized by 
Plaintiff's family that they were "living together" the 
majority of the time for 1986 to the time they were married 
and certain implications with regard to Kaylene's employment 
being terminated based upon the wishes of Odell. R. 68, 69, 
73, 77. The findings and conclusions entered by the Court 
simply are not supported by the evidence at trial and should 
not have been entered based upon the objections by Odell's 
attorney. 
Second, the findings do not specifically note Odell1s 
ability to earn income or his expenses. The findings do 
note what Kaylene's current income is but do not set forth 
what her ability to earn income is. 
Finally, the Court further erred in its award of 
alimony based upon an error which the Court made at trial in 
failing to allow Odell to introduce certain documents which 
had great bearing on the terms of the parties pre-marital 
relationship and upon Kaylene's veracity. These documents, 
Odell's exhibit 4 and 5. 
Odell will further show, on appeal, that the Court 
erred in requiring him to pay the income tax liability 
incurred as a result of Kaylene taking an income tax refund 
and cashing the check when that refund should have been 
returned to the State Tax Commission as a result of the 
parties filing an amended and joint income tax return. 
The final issue on appeal is attorney fees which were 
inappropriately awarded on the basis that there was no 
showing of need by Kaylene, for that award. The Court in 
this case entered findings which preponderate against the 
actual evidence taken at trial and which resulted in a 
serious inequity between the parties. As such, the case 
should be reversed and remanded. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD OF 
ALIMONY. 
The Court should remand this case for further findings 
with regard to alimony or should reverse the alimony award 
altogether on the basis that the Findings and Conclusions 
entered below are not sufficient to support the alimony 
award. In the alternative, the Court should reverse with 
regard to alimony on the basis that the evidence at trial 
preponderates against the finding of alimony entered by the 
Court. 
A. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
inadequate to support the award of alimony. 
The factors that a Court must consider in making an 
award of alimony are well established in recent case law. 
These factors are 1, the financial conditions and needs of 
the wife; 2, the ability of the wife to produce an income 
for herself; and 3, the ability of the husband to provide 
support. See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985) . In viewing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law then, this Court must consider whether the Findings 
address each of those factors. 
The first factor is the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife. This factor is probably the most clearly 
addressed in the findings of fact which are as follows: 
1. Prior to the parties marriage the Plaintiff 
was working and earning net income of approximately 
$1,000.00 per month. Plaintiff also was earning 
$1,000.00 during this marriage. The Plaintiff 
terminated her employment and Plaintiff is now only 
making approximately $400.00 income per month. R. 73 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
2. That the Plaintiff needs income on an average 
monthly basis of $1,162.00 to enable her to live 
similar to how she lived during the marriage and to 
meet her current living expenses and obligations. R. 73 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
3» The Plaintiff has suffered an economic 
disadvantage as a result of the marriage in that she 
does not have as good employment as she had before the 
marriage and during the marriage before she quit her 
employment at the urging of the Defendant... . R. 77 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
With regard to the second factor, that being the 
ability of the wife to produce an income for herself, there 
is no specific finding except as otherwise listed above. 
There is also no specific finding as to Odell's ability 
to provide support. The only thing mentioned with regard to 
Odell's financial situation was the amounts of money that he 
received prior to this marriage as a settlement from a 
divorce from his former wife. This settlement was 
specifically to compensate Odell for his share of marital 
assets in the first marriage. R. 70 (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law). The only other finding or conclusion 
of law with regard to Odell's earning potential was that 
there was some interest earned on bank accounts at First 
Security Bank in Idaho. However, the Court specifically 
found that that income was dissipated in living expenses 
during the time the parties were married. R. 77 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law) 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that the trial 
court must make findings on all material issues. Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2nd 996 (Utah 1987). These findings should 
be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
which factual issue was reached. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2nd 952, 958 (Utah 1988). Quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 
P.2nd 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
In the case at bar, the only specific finding as to the 
financial condition and the need of Kaylene was that she had 
a need of living expenses in the amount of $1,162.00 per 
month. There is no finding as to her ability to produce 
income simply that she was, at the time of trial, earning 
$400.00 per month as opposed to the $1,000.00 per month 
which she had earned prior to and during the marriage. The 
Court completely failed to enter adequate findings as to the 
ability of Odell to provide support. All the Court finds in 
this regard is that he has assets which he acquired to 
marriage. The Supreme Court has clearly held that Findings 
of Fact made by the trial court which fail to specifically 
set forth the paying spousels financial condition, income 
and ability to pay are insufficient. Stevens, at 958. There 
is no specific finding as to how much Odell makes on a 
monthly basis or what his ability to pay is relative to his 
own living expenses. 
The Court further erred in entering a finding and 
conclusion which, by its own terms is contradictory. Judge 
Judkins, scratched out a portion of paragraph 16 of the 
Findings of Fact and eliminated language which says that 
Plaintiff terminated her employment because of the wishes 
and desires of the Defendant. Not withstanding this fact, 
the Court allowed as a conclusion of law that Plaintiff had 
suffered an economic disadvantage as a result of the 
marriage and that she does not have as good as employment as 
she had before the marriage and during the marriage before 
she quit her employment at the urging of the Defendant. R. 
77 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) . These two 
statements contradict themselves. Even were these 
statements excluded, the findings are not support by 
evidence at trial. 
The evidence showed that the parties had a marriage 
which lasted from August 14, 1989 to approximately August of 
1991 when the parties were separated and a verified 
complaint was filed. Further, Odell testified that, at 
least a portion of that two (2) year marriage Kaylene did 
not live with him on a steady basis. T. 103 - 110. The 
Court abused its discretion in ordering Odell to pay alimony 
of almost $29,000.00 on a two (2) year marriage, where he 
has no independent source of income other than pre-marital 
assets or social security and where that marriage was 
centered around a relationship which can best be described 
as sporadic. 
B. The Court erred in entering the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law when those Findings and Conclusions 
were disputed. 
Kaylene1s attorney prepared the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and forwarded those to Odell*s attorney 
on September 24, 1992. R. 66. Odell*s attorney replied by 
a letter dated October 1, 1992, indicating that he disagreed 
with the Findings at paragraph 10, 15, 16 and 17 and 
paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce on the basis that they 
appeared more as arguments at Court rather than specific 
Findings. R. 67. (Letter to Jeff Thorne dated October 1, 
1992). Rather than revise the Findings, Kaylene's attorney 
submitted them to the Court with a letter to Judge Judkins 
dated October 5, 1992 with a notation that "it appears that 
we are not able to agree as to what should be placed in the 
Findings and Conclusions; therefore, I am submitting them to 
you for either signing or modification as you see fit". The 
Court made one change to paragraph 16 of the Findings of 
Fact and made no changes to the Decree of Divorce. R. 73 -
83 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce). Without other dealings or input as to the content 
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Odell's 
attorney withdrew as counsel on October 14, 1992. 
Two (2) errors were committed throughout this course of 
events. First, Odell's attorney should have objected under 
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, to 
the proposed Findings, Judgments and Decree. Second, the 
Court should not have modified the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law without a hearing on the matter. As set 
forth above, certain of the Findings especially with regard 
to alimony took the form of arguments at trial rather than 
actual findings of the Court. Notwithstanding this fact, 
they were entered as the court's findings without hearing or 
other input by Odell's attorney. As such, the Findings are 
against the weight of the evidence and are improperly 
entered under Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
C. The Court erred in failing to allow admission of 
certain evidence. 
Kaylene testified at trial the parties entered into a 
relationship in 1980 which became intimate in approximately 
January of 1981. From that point forward that the 
relationship "continued on a regular basis" during the 
entire time that Kaylene worked for Odell. T. 12. Kaylene 
further testified that marriage was "talked about all the 
time", T. 13, and that when Odell moved to Brigham that he 
was living with Kaylene until he bought a separate residence 
and that they had a regular relationship going on "month 
after month after month". T. 15, 16. Kaylene later admitted 
on cross-examine that they did see other people for a period 
of time in 1988, that they were not living as husband and 
wife from the period of 1986 to 1988 and that she "saw one 
other man and was with him maybe two (2) times". T. 41 -
44. Kaylene further testified that Odell never spent time 
staying with his parents during the time that the parties 
lived in Brigham. T. 42. Most of these statements were 
contradicted by Odell. 
Odell testified on direct examination that the 
relationship was "explosive and unpredictable and very 
uncertain". T. 77. Odell further testified that he moved 
directly into the Condominium in Brigham and, impliedly, did 
not live with Kaylene for a period of two (2) months. T. 73. 
Odell testified that he spent a great deal of time at his 
parents home and spent the night there at least twice a 
week. T. 81 - 85. Odell further testified, in contradiction 
to Kaylene's testimony that he did not want her to quit her 
job at Brigham Realty and did not want her to quit her job 
at Richard's Manufacturing Jewelers. T. 99 and 100. 
Odell*s attorney attempted to admit into evidence, a 
letter marked Defendant's exhibit #4, which was a letter to 
Kaylene's girlfriend in Idaho and dated January 7, 1990. 
Odell testified that he found the letter in the garbage 
where it was torn up and that he pieced it together. The 
first page of exhibit #4 was read into evidence. Odell*s 
attorney also attempted to admit exhibit #5, another letter 
from Kaylene to her parents and dated January 5, 1990 into 
evidence. This letter was also found in the trash where it 
had been torn up and was also pieced back together by Odell. 
At trial, the following exchange took place: 
MR. THORNEi Well, again, your honor, I guess I am 
having some problem. If I understand both of these, 
these were written and may have expressed her thought 
process, but she tears them up and doesn't send them 
and communicated them. 
THE COURT: How is it material what she threw in the 
garbage? If they had received the letters, maybe, but 
she throws them in the garbage. 
MR. JOHNSi It is material in that it shows her thought 
processes. It shows her commitment to the marriage, in 
the case of this first one. This one will show her 
relationship with Odell regarding the job. This one 
will go on an entirely different track, your honor, 
because this one is going to show, and what we are 
offering this for, is to show the quitting of the job 
at Nordstrom and at Richards Manufacturing Jewelers was 
at her desire and her interest, counter to her previous 
testimony on the stand. Now that's what this 
particular letter is going to go for. 
MR. THORNEr Well — 
MR. JOHNSi And their statements to that fact. 
THE COURT: I am going to sustain the objection. If 
the letter had been delivered then it would be a 
different situation, but where she wrote a letter and 
threw it away, obviously torn up, I don't see that 
that's material. I am going to sustain the objection, 
unless you can show anything else. T. 96-97. 
Neither exhibit 4 or exhibit 5 was admitted into 
evidence. Brent Johns, Odell's attorney specifically 
pointed out that the letters go to Kaylene's veracity and 
contradicts her previous testimony. T. 94. 
The Court apparently declined to admit these letters 
into evidence on the basis that they were thrown away rather 
than delivered. 
It is not certain as to what rule of evidence the Court 
relied on in declining to allow these letters into evidence. 
Since the Court made inquiry as to the letters relevance it 
is assumed that the letters were not admitted into evidence 
on the basis of relevance. However, relevant evidence under 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence "means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable then it would be without the 
evidence". Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 402. If the 
evidence is relevant then all relevant evidence is 
admissible unless its probative value is substantially out 
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See, Utah Rules 
of Evidence Rules 402 & 403. In the case at bar there is no 
evidence as to whether the probative value of these letters 
were substantially out weighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. It is not certain whether the Court declined to 
admit them into evidence on the basis of relevancy. 
The second option as to the Courts failure to admit 
these letters is under some notion that they do not go the 
credibility of the witness or the witnesses veracity as 
submitted by Odell1s attorney. The letters were to be 
admitted to show differences in what Kaylene had written in 
the letters regarding seeing other men and her statements 
regarding Odell urging her to quit her jobs. Rule 613 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure governs prior statements of 
witnesses. 613 (b) provides as follows: 
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement by a witness is not admissible unless the 
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny 
the same and the opposite party is afforded an 
opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the 
interests of justice otherwise require. 
In the case at bar, the letters should have been 
admitted into evidence on cross examination of Odell. 
Kaylene would have then had the opportunity to explain or 
deny the letters on redirect examination and Odell given the 
opportunity to interrogate her on recross examination. 
Odell%s attorney chose to introduce the letters on a direct 
examination assumedly so that a foundation could be laid as 
to how the letters were obtained. This would still, 
however, give Kaylene the opportunity to explain or deny the 
content of the letters. 
Because the Court declined to admit the letters into 
evidence, Kaylene's veracity was not necessarily called into 
question and important contradictions in her testimony were 
not allowed into evidence. 
D. The Court erred in awarding alimony out of 
pre-marital assets. 
As indicated above the Court made no finding as to 
Odell1 s source of income. It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that alimony is paid out of assets which Odell 
received as a settlement from his prior marriage. There is 
no dispute that all of the assets received by Odell arose 
from the relationship with his previous wife, the sale of 
the farm or the purchasing of Odell1s interest in that farm. 
There is, likewise, no issue that the assets were not 
co-mingled. 
When a Decree of Divorce is entered, the Court may 
include in it "equitable orders relating to the children, 
property and parties ... ". U.C.A. 30-3-5(1) (1989). The 
purpose of property division is to allocate property in the 
manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best 
permits them to pursue their separate lives. Nobel v. 
Novel, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) Quoting Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). The Utah Court of 
Appeals set out a standard and list of factors generally 
considered in fashioning a property division where part or 
all of the property is pre-marital property. Walters v. 
Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991). In the Walters 
case, the Court set forth approximately twelve (12) factors 
which should be considered in making a distribution of 
property. These factors, and their relevance to the case at 
bar are set forth below: 
1. The amount and kind of property to be divided: The 
only property at issue herein was the payments received by 
Odell which constituted either earnings off the farm 
property which he held in common with his ex-wife, or 
principal or interest from the sale of that property. Part 
of the property also includes five (5) certificates of 
deposit with First Security Bank in Idaho held jointly with 
Odell and his children. Each account having an initial 
deposit of $36,000.00. 
2. Whether the property was acquired before or during 
the marriage: Odell received a portion of this settlement 
prior to marriage in the form of a $30,000.00 lump sum 
payment in April of 1986 and thereafter 3 or 4 payments of 
$25,000.00 each. The remainder of the proceeds from his 
prior divorce settlement was not actually received until 
March of 1991. 
3. The source of the property: There is no dispute 
that the source of the property was from a settlement on 
Odell 4s previous divorce. -It is uncertain as to whether the 
money constituted earnings off the farm property or 
principal and interest from the sale of that property. 
4. The health of the parties: The only testimony in 
this regard was that Kaylene would be required to undergo a 
hysterectomy or a D&C and that Odell had been hit in the 
head approximately three (3) years prior to trial which has 
caused him to be unable to work. 
5. The parties standard of living, respective 
financial conditions, needs and earning capacity: As set 
forth above, there was no specific finding as to either 
parties earning capacity except that Kaylene had earned both 
before and during the marriage at least $1,000.00 per month. 
Odell had no income, per se, except for social security. 
Odell remained in the marital home but it is uncertain as to 
each of the parties standard of living. 
6. The duration of the marriage: The marriage lasted 
approximately two (2) years until Kaylene filed for a 
divorce. 
7. The children of the marriage: There were no 
children of the marriage. 
8. The parties ages at the time of the marriage and of 
divorce i It is not certain as to the parties ages it is 
only certain that Odell is 15 years older than Kaylene. T. 
116. 
9. What the parties gave up by the marriage: It is 
uncertain what the parties gave up by the marriage. Both 
parties moved from their homes in Idaho to obtain homes in 
Brigham City. Odell had purchased a condominium in Brigham 
City which he had to sell at a loss. T. 76. Odell did not 
work during the course of the marriage, Kaylene worked full 
time during the marriage, quit that job and was working part 
time at trial. 
10. Necessary relationship the property division has 
with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded: 
There is no child support so that is not an issue. There is 
a direct relationship between the property division and the 
amount of alimony because alimony could not paid from any 
other source. Odell had no source of income other than a 
small amount of social security which he was receiving or 
was about to receive. The only way that alimony could be 
paid would be out of the property division. 
11. Whether one spouse has made any contribution 
towards the growth of the separate assets of the other 
spousei Odell testified that Kaylene made no financial 
contribution to the marriage and that any money earned by 
her was kept by her with the exception of paying a phone 
bill. T. 105, 106. There is no dispute that Kaylene did 
not make any contribution toward the settlement money as 
received from Odell*s prior divorce. 
12. Whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by 
the joint efforts of the parties: It is undisputed that the 
only asset accumulated by the parties was the home. No 
other assets were accumulated or enhanced by joint effort of 
the parties. Specifically, the settlement monies received 
by Odell were received, maintained, and used entirely 
separate from Kaylene. 
The Court of Appeals in the Walters case noted that the 
last two (2) factors were of particular concern. Further 
that the trial court can reallocate pre-marital property as 
part of a property division where "unique circumstances 
exist". Walters at 67. 
In the case at bar, Kaylene made no contribution toward 
growth of separate assets, made no effort to accumulate the 
assets or to enhance its value. This situation is not so 
"unique" as to justify the award of alimony from pre-marital 
assets. The court should not have awarded Kaylene alimony 
which, of necessity, had to have been paid out of the 
separate assets. This has effectively awarded Kaylene a 
portion of the pre-marital property which she could not have 
gotten as property. It would have been inappropriate to 
award Kaylene a portion of those assets as personal property 
and it is likewise inappropriate to award Kaylene those 
assets even though that award takes the form of alimony. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ODELL TO INCUR 
THE INCOME TAX LIABILITY. 
The Court, without explanation required Odell to pay 
the income tax liability to the State of Utah or the IRS for 
all years during the marriage. This Court's specific 
language with regard to the income tax liability in its 
entirety is "the Defendant shall pay the income tax, 
liability whatever it was, that $227.00". There is no 
finding as to why Odell was required to pay that income tax 
liability and no comment made on the testimony regarding 
that income tax liability. 
Testimony at trial indicated that the income tax 
liability resulted because Kaylene filed a separate income 
tax return and received a tax refund. Odell persuaded 
Kaylene to file a joint income tax return by means of filing 
an amended return. Kaylene cashed the income tax refund 
against the wishes of Odell, and did not refund that amount 
to the State of Utah. T. 108 - 109 and 6 2 - 6 4 . Odell 
submits that the trial court erred in ordering him to incur 
that income tax liability when the liability arose solely 
because Kaylene inappropriately kept an income tax refund 
and cashed it. Had she not taken this action, there would 
have been no other liability in dispute. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ODELL TO PAY 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
Under Utah Code Annotated §30-3-3 (1989) a court may 
award attorney fees in a divorce proceeding. "In order to 
award attorney fees, the trial court must find the 
requesting party is in need of financial assistance and that 
the fees requested are reasonable." Walters v. Walters, 812 
P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1991) . 
The Court, in the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law with regard to attorney fees simply provided that 
Plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorney fees and judgment 
shall enter against the Defendant in favor of the Plaintiff 
in said amount, R. 76 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law) In its actual ruling, the Court simply stated that 
"the Court is going to award $2,000.00 attorney's fees in 
behalf of the Plaintiff". T. 174. There is no finding as 
to Kaylene's financial need or as to the reasonableness of 
the request. The award of attorney's fees is inadequately 
supported. See, Anderson v. Anderson, 368 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1962) . In addition no finding was entered with regard to 
the ability of Odell to pay attorney's fees as also required 
by §30-3-3 of the Utah Code and under case law. See Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In 
the case of Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) , the Utah Court of Appeals discussed an award of 
attorney fees. "The Court made no findings on wife's need 
for the payment of her fees, husband's ability to pay the 
fees, or the reasonableness of the attorney fees." Bell at 
p.494. 
In the immediate case, there is no finding as to 
Kaylene's need for the payment of her fees, Odell's ability 
to pay the fees or the reasonableness of the attorney's 
fees. In fact, reasonableness of the attorney's fees was 
disputed by counsel in closing argument. T. 169, 169. As a 
result, the Court should reverse the trial court's decision 
with regard to attorney fees, 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court has abused its discretion and, as a 
result, a serious inequity has occurred in this case. The 
initial order which proved to be inequitable was that of 
alimony. The Court awarded Kaylene alimony in spite of the 
fact that the marriage only lasted for approximately two (2) 
years and without finding as to Kaylene1s ability to support 
herself. Any alimony paid would, of necessity, come out of 
Odell*s property which he received as settlement from a 
prior marriage and which was specifically found not to be a 
marital asset. There was no order entered with regard to 
Odell*s ability to pay alimony. The Findings of Fact, which 
were disputed, are inadequate to support the Court's award. 
As a result, the Court abused its discretion with regard to 
alimony. 
The second inequity from the Court's ruling is with 
regard to the income tax liability. That tax liability was 
incurred as a result of bad faith on the part of Kaylene and 
for no other reason. Odell should not be obligated to pay 
for her mistakes. 
Finally, the Court erred in awarding Kaylene her 
attorney's fees. No facts were entered with regard to 
Kaylene's need, Odell *s ability to pay or as to 
reasonableness of the fee. Based upon these reasons the 
case should be reversed and remanded on each of these 
issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this TA day of June, 1993. 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY 
rney for Appellant 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAYLENE S. SMITH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
ODELL M. SMITH, JR., ) 
Defendant. 
| FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 910000459DA 
( Judge Clint S. Judkins 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 28th 
day of August, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 o'clock a.m. The 
plaintiff was personally present and was represented by her 
counsel of record, Jeff R. Thome of the firm of Mann, Hadfield 
and Thorne. The defendant was present and was represented by his 
counsel, Brent E. Johns. The plaintiff introduced her evidence 
and testified in said matter; and the defendant introduced his 
evidence and testified in said matter. The court being fully 
familiar in the premises issues the following Findings of Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
The parties have had a romantic relationship beginning in 1980. 
From 1986 and continuing up to the date the parties were married 
Smith vs Smith, #910000459 
Findings & Conclusions 
on August 14, 1989 at Challis, Idaho the parties spent the 
majority of each week living together. Even though the parties 
had an intimate relationship, the parties did not represent 
themselves to be husband and wife to their friends or to their 
family. It was commonly recognized by plaintiff's family that 
they were "living together" the majority of time from 1986 to the 
time they were married. The parties relationship contributed to 
each party's divorce from their prior spouses. 
DATE OP MARRIAGE 
2. The plaintiff and defendant were married on August 14, 
1989 at Challis, Idaho. 
NO CHILDREN 
3. No children have been born as issue of said marriage 
and none are expected. 
RESIDENCE OF PARTIES 
4. The plaintiff and the defendant are residents of Box 
Elder County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three 
months immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
5. During the course of the marriage and the months 
preceding the filing of the action, irreconcilable differences 
developed such that the very purposes of the marriage were 
destroyed. 
2 
Smith vs Smith, #910000459 
Findings & Conclusions 
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY FROM PRIOR MARRIAGE 
6. Odell Smith was divorced from his former wife, Renae 
Smith in March, 1986 in the State of Idaho. As part of his 
written settlement agreement with his first wife, Odell Smith was 
entitled to cash payments of $210,000.00 and $150,000.00. The 
prior divorce decree provided that the $210,000.00 was to be paid 
$30,000.00 on or before April 20, 1986, $30,000.00 upon the 
closing of a loan (the terms of the loan were mentioned in the 
decree), $150,000,000 payable in annual payments of $25,000.00 
per year including interest at the rate of eight percent annum 
from the date of March 27, 1986. Additionally, Mr. Smith was to 
be paid by his former wife an additional $150,000.00 within five 
years from the date of the divorce. The payments were to 
compensate Mr. Smith for his share of the marital assets in his 
first marriage. Mr. Smith, also, received other assets under his 
prior divorce. 
ASSETS IN BANKS AT TIME OF THE DIVORCE 
7. At the time the divorce action was filed, there was in 
an account in the name of Odell M. Smith with American First 
Credit Union a balance of $41,275.00 as of September 14, 1991, 
together with a share savings account in the amount of $9,532.16. 
Mr. Smith testified at one time Kaylene's name was on his 
checking account, but he removed it because "she spent too much.11 
3 
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Odell Smith also had five different certificates of deposit with 
First Security Bank in Challis, Idaho. The money was deposited 
on March 27, 1991, each account had initial deposit of $36,000,00 
and which accrued interest at the rate of 6.83% per annum. These 
accounts totalled $180,000.00 on March 17, 1992. Mr. Smith 
testified the money for these accounts came from payments from 
his first wife. 
CHALLIS PROPERTY 
8. Odell Smith also received a cabin and real property in 
Challis, Idaho, which came from his divorce settlement with his 
first wife. 
$249.120.93 PAYMENT RECEIVED DURING THIS MARRIAGE 
9. Odell Smith received the sum of $249,120.93 on or about 
March 27, 1991 from his former wife and/or son for his share of 
any interest in the farm properties he was awarded under his 
prior divorce decree. Mr. Smith was unable to articulate how the 
amount of money was computed. He was unable to state whether 
the money constituted earnings off the farm property which he 
held in common with his ex-wife or whether it was all principal 
or interest from the sale of the property. 
HOME PURCHASED IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
10. A home was purchased at 70 North 200 East, Brigham 
City, Utah on June 27, 1989, approximately six weeks prior to the 
time the parties were married. Title to the home was only in Mr. 
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Smithfs name. The home was purchased with Mrs. Smith's consent 
and knowledge and was the marital home of the parties. The 
parties stipulated that the home had a market value of 
$63,000.00, and there exists a lien against the home in the 
approximate amount of $29,000,00. A $25,000.00 down payment was 
made by the defendant out of his separate funds. The court 
determines that there is a $9,000.00 equity in the family home. 
AUTOMOBILE PURCHASED DURING MARRIAGE 
11. In July, 1991 a 1991 Dodge Shadow automobile was 
purchased, which has a fair market value of $7,000.00. The 
automobile was purchased with funds from the checking account 
with America First Credit Union account. 
LOT AND STORAGE PURCHASED IN 1986 
12. The defendant purchased a lot and storage building in 
1986 in Brigham City, Utah. The lot and building has a fair 
market value of $18,500.00. This real estate was titled in Mr. 
Smith's name. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY BEFORE MARRIAGE 
13. The plaintiff had a table and four chairs, a roll-top 
desk, a couch, a green rocker, a square end table, a bathroom 
bench, and a green hanging lamp, which was her property before 
the marriage which was taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho after 
the parties were married. 
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PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING MARRIAGE 
14. During the marriage, the parties purchased a three-
piece white leather furniture set, two area rugs, a grandfather 
clock, a toaster, various wall hangings, a silk flower 
arrangement, and vacuum. 
MEDICAL NEEDS OF PLAINTIFF 
15. The plaintiff is in need of surgery pursuant to a 
letter of Dr. C. M. Dibble, M.D. which was admitted into 
evidence. Plaintiff's medical condition requiring surgery arose 
during this marriage. 
EMPLOYMENT OF PLAINTIFF 
16. Prior to the parties' marriage, the plaintiff was 
working and earning net income of approximately $1,000.00 per 
month. Plaintiff also was earning $1,000.00 during this C 0u(O 
marriage. The plaintiff terminated her employment because of te 
wLblrea and UeJllUb uJU Lhe dgfSH35f*fc and plaintiff is now only 
making approximately $400.00 income per month. 
LIVING EXPENSES OF PLAINTIFF 
17. The plaintiff needs income on an average monthly basis 
of $1,162.00 to enable her to live similar to how she lived 
during the marriage and to meet her current living expenses and 
obligations. 
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SOCIAL SECURITY AVAILABILITY TO DEFENDANT 
18. The defendant is eligible for social security, but has 
not applied for social security at the present time. The 
defendant states that he would be entitled to social security of 
approximately $350.00 per month. The defendant has not been 
employed during the time the parties have been married. 
DEBTS 
19. The only debts are the debt existing against the home 
in Brigham City, Utah. 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT 
THE COURT CONCLUDES: 
MARRIAGE PROPERTY 
1. The only joint property the parties have acquired 
during the time of the marriage is the equity in the home which 
was purchased. The court sets the equity at $9,000.00. The 
defendant shall pay to the plaintiff $4,500.00 within 60 days as 
and for her share of the equity. 
AUTOMOBILE 
2. The 1991 Dodge automobile was purchased with the 
defendant's separate funds. The automobile will be awarded to 
the defendant. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
7 
Smith vs Smith, #910000459 
Findings & Conclusions 
3. The plaintiff shall be awarded the loveseat, chair and 
vacuum. The defendant shall receive the remainder of the items 
acquired during the marriage. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED PRIOR TO MARRIAGE 
4. The plaintiff shall be entitled to the items of 
property which were taken to the cabin in Challis, Idaho which 
were hers prior to the time the parties married. Those items of 
property are the table and four chairs, roll-top desk, couch, 
green rocker, square end table, bathroom bench, and green hanging 
lamp. The defendant shall return those items to plaintiff within 
10 days. 
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 
5. The defendant shall be awarded the Bible, the carved 
Bible stand, the Revere Ware, the five quart pan with lilac 
handles, the pressure cooker, the knife block and paring knives, 
as well as any of his cassette tapes which may be in plaintiff's 
possession. All other items of personal property which plaintiff 
has in her possession shall remain hers and shall be her sole and 
separate property. 
PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES 
8 
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6. The defendant shall pay any medical expenses related to 
plaintiff's surgery not covered by insurance, if those expenses 
are incurred within the next six (6) months. 
LOT AND STORAGE SHED 
7. The court finds that the lot and storage shed were 
purchased by separate funds by the defendant and are awarded to 
him. 
HOME 
8. The home of the parties is awarded to the defendant 
subject to a lien in the amount of $4,500.00 to be paid by the 
defendant to the plaintiff within 60 days from the date of this 
hearing. 
INCOME TAX LIABILITY 
9. The defendant shall pay the income tax liability to the 
State of Utah or IRS for all years during the marriage. 
PLAINTIFF RESTORED TO FORMER NAME 
10. The plaintiff has requested that she be restored to her 
former name of Koyle and the plaintiff's name shall henceforth be 
and she shall be known as Kathleen S. Koyle. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
11. The plaintiff is awarded $2,000.00 attorney's fees and 
judgment shall enter against the defendant in favor of the 
plaintiff in said amount. 
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INTEREST ON 8AVING3 ACCOUNT 
12. The court finds that any interest earned on the 
$180,000.00 at First Security Bank in Idaho was marital property, 
but that income was dissipated in living expenses during the time 
the parties were married. 
EXTRA MARITAL AFFAIR 
13. Even though the parties had a long-term relationship, 
the majority of that time was spent as an extra marital rather 
than a marriage relationship. 
ALIMONY 
14. The plaintiff has suffered an economic disadvantage as 
a result of the marriage in that she does not have as good as 
employment as she had before the marriage and during the marriage 
before she quit her employment at the urging of the defendant. 
The plaintiff is entitled to alimony for four years. Alimony is 
twice as long as the length of the marriage. The court will, 
however, give the defendant credit for one year of alimony 
inasmuch as they have been separated and the defendant has been 
paying temporary alimony since September, 1991. The defendant 
shall pay alimony to the plaintiff in the amount of $643.00 
beginning with the month of September, 1992 for a period of one 
10 
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year, or until August of 1993 Thereafter, he shall, pay a.l i.mony 
in the amount of ShOU.OO per mm the next two years or up 
until August of 1995. 
DATED this _./^ '/.. day of rf .'fftf.xk rx iqq? 
CLBJT^S-^JUDKINS 
DISTRICT .TTTnGE PRO TEM 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Brent E. Johns 
Attorney for Defendant 
pj'/3:smith-k.fnd 
APPENDIX B 
REED W. HADFIELD 
JEFF R. THORNE 
BEN H HAD FIELD 
I A W O F F I C E S 
M A N N H A D F I E L D A N D T H O R N E 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
Z I O N S BANK BLII I . D I N G 
9 6 N O R T H M A I N 
P. O. BOX 8 7 6 
B R I G H A M CITY, U T A H 8 4 3 0 2 - 0 8 7 6 
T E L E P H O N E ( S O U 7 2 3 - 3 4 0 4 
F A X (SOI ) 7 2 3 - 8 8 0 7 
September 24, 1992 
WALTER G. MANN H"in"!Ml ll'l 
B r e n t E< j0hns 
2411 Kiesel Avenue, Su i t R 1111 
OGDEN UT 84401 
Rp" Si in :ii th » '« Son t- h 
Dear Brent: 
Enclosed you will find H I P f 
1. The original and one copy or the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
2. The original and one copy of the Decree of Divorce. 
Would you please approve the documents as to form and retur n 
them to me as soon as possible and I will have them filed with 
the court.. 
If you have any changes which you think should be made, 
please contact me as soon as possible and we wi 1 1 try to get the 
changes made that we can agree to. 
Very truly yours, 
nkiili I I A M F I E L U > I I H ' J R U E 
By,. 
JRT/pj 
Enclosures 
pi/1:Johns-b.ks 
APPENDIX C 
October 1 1992 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2411 Kiesel Ave. 
Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401-2391 
(801) 394-5581 
FAX (801) 394-5583 
Jeff R. Thorne 
Attorney at Law 
Zions Bank Building 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham Ci t;y , * * 
RE: Smith vs 
TV,-* r U"> f *" • 
Wnith 
In response to the Findings and Decree you prepared for the above 
referenced divorce, T have some concerns. 
Particularly, the -ending of paragraphs 10, 15, 1 6 and 1 7 of the 
Conclusions and paragraph 14 of the Decree. These paragraphs 
appear to be more the arguments presented in Coiii: t rather than the 
Courtf s findings, 
i ui.ucistand that you picked up a copy of the Court's transcript 
oi; the hearing. Would you please either review it again and 
incorporate more precisely what the Judge said rather than the 
arguments, or send a copy of i t on to me so that I may revi ew it 
Thank you for your consideration. 
ia:
. , J iy 
j o i i n r 
A;tornev i 
ekv x 
k 
u 
2% 
*s?--
> * 
99? -
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2411 Kiesel Ave. 
Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401-2391 
(801)394-5581 
FAX (801) 394-5583 
O c t o b e r 9 , 1992 
Jeff R. Thorne 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham Citv. v ^ h - * 
b-\' . ^m 11 h vs. oiiii1 ii 
Dear Jeff: 
Thank you for sending the copy of the Court transcript After 
reviewing it, I believe the changes I have requested are in line. 
I have made the chdnqes on the original Findings and Decree and am 
r •-• turn i nq !••':*-»• * • *• 
Findings of Fact Paragraph 10; Th<-f •- w
 : • r . :-:..;'. ~,n ^ i evidence 
that the horn** u-,- purchased with Mr-. Smith's consent and 
knowledge * 
Findings of Fact Paragraph 15: There i s i 10 proof tha t the 
Plaintifffs medical condition arose during the marriage. This is 
unsubstantiated. 
Findings of Fact Paragraph 16: The Court did not find th.ii. the 
Plaintiff terminated her eiitp] oyment because of the wishes and 
desires of the Defendant. 
Findings of Fact Paragraph 17: The Court determined that Plaintiff 
was entitled to alimony• The remainder of paragraph " -
part -f tl" "-urt's findings. 
Decree of Li voice Paragraph . i :»v -niy proolem with Paragraph 14 
o' the Decree is that I don *t believe it is necessary. 
If thos^; in nrications were ma-.* -. . j..::ngs and Decree I would 
r; * have
 ci problem with them. 
Since: 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
c c : rw]^ | i IIIIH i ( 11, 
APPENDIX D 
Brent E. Johns, Bar No. 1705 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2411 Kiesel Avenue, Suite 101 
Ogden, Utah 84401-2391 
Telephone: (801) 394-5581 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAYLENE S. SMITH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ODELL M. SMITH, JR., 
Defendant 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
CIVIL NO. 910000459DA 
Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
COMES NOW attorney Brent E. Johns, and hereby withdraws as 
counsel for the Defendant herein to become effective immediately. 
DATED this day of October, 1992 
Brent E. Johns/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Withdrawal to Jeff R. Thorne, Attorney for Plaintiff, at P.O. Box 
876, Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876, and to Odell Smith, Defendant, 
at 70 jNorth 200 East, Brigham City, Utah 843C)2, postage pre-paid 
this /^fk, day of October, 1992 
'// 
ecretary 
/ yo7y£ i 
APPENDIX E 
REED W. HADFIELD 
JEFF R. THORNE 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
L A W O F F I C E S 
M A N N , H A D F I E L D A N D T H O R N E 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
Z I O N S BANK B U I L D I N G 
9 3 NORTH MAIN 
P. O. BOX S 7 6 
B R I G H A M CITY, UTAH 8 4 3 0 2 - 0 8 7 6 
T E L E P H O N E (SOI) 7 2 3 - 3 4 0 4 
FAX (SOI) 7 2 3 - 8 8 0 7 
October 5, 1992 
WALTER G. MANN, RETIRED 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
First District Court 
Box Elder County Courthouse 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302 
Re: Smith vs Smith, #910000459 
Dear Judge Judkins: 
Enclosed is a letter I sent to Brent Johns on September 24, 
1992, together with a letter he sent to me dated October 1, 1992. 
I have also enclosed a copy of the original Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
It appears that we are not able to agree as to what should 
be placed in the Findings and Conclusions; therefore, I am 
submitting them to you for either signing or modification as you 
see fit. 
Very truly yours, 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
By. 
JRT/pj 
Enclosures 
p j / 1 : j judkins. Jcs 
W^-
c c : Brent E. Johns 
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